The 25-Year War by America's Military Role in Vietnam
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Von Händler/Antiquariat, Green_Earth_Books.
From May 1st, 1950, the day President Truman authorized the first U.S. military assistance to Indochina, to April 30th, 1975, the day Saigon fell to the North Vietnamese regime, America was engaged in the longest conflict in its history. This is the story of what went wrong. Bruce Palmer was the Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army from 1968 to 1973. His insights into the key events and decisions that shaped America's military role in Vietnam are uncommonly perceptive. In this penetrating work, he not only presents an insider's history of the war, but also gives an astute critique of America's military strengths and weaknesses. This book is certain to become a standard reference for anyone seriously interested in how America lost the Vietnam war., Paperback, Label: Da Capo Press, Da Capo Press, Produktgruppe: Book, Publiziert: 1990-03-21, Studio: Da Capo Press, Verkaufsrang: 11774338.

Lieferung aus: Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika, Lagernd.
asia,history,military,military science,southeast asia,vietnam,vietnam war, The 25-year War (Da Capo Paperback), From May 1st, 1950, the day President Truman authorized the first U.S. military assistance to Indochina, to April 30th, 1975, the day Saigon fell to the North Vietnamese regime, America was engaged in the longest conflict in its history. This is the story of what went wrong. Bruce Palmer was the Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army from 1968 to 1973. His insights into the key events and decisions that shaped America's military role in Vietnam are uncommonly perceptive. In this penetrating work, he not only presents an insider's history of the war, but also gives an astute critique of America's military strengths and weaknesses. This book is certain to become a standard reference for anyone seriously interested in how America lost the Vietnam war.

Lieferung aus: Niederlande, 5-10 werkdagen.
bol.com.
" On April 30, 1975, Saigon and the government of South Vietnam fell to the communist regime of North Vietnam, ending -- for American military forces -- exactly twenty-five year of courageous but unavailing struggle. This is not the story of how America became embroiled in a conflict in a small country half-way around the globe, nor of why our armed forces remained there so long after the futility of our efforts became obvious to many. It is the story of what went wrong there militarily, and why..., " On April 30, 1975, Saigon and the government of South Vietnam fell to the communist regime of North Vietnam, ending -- for American military forces -- exactly twenty-five year of courageous but unavailing struggle. This is not the story of how America became embroiled in a conflict in a small country half-way around the globe, nor of why our armed forces remained there so long after the futility of our efforts became obvious to many. It is the story of what went wrong there militarily, and why. The author is a professional soldier who experienced the Vietnam war in the field and in the highest command echelons. General Palmer's insights into the key events and decisions that shaped American's military role in Vietnam are uncommonly perceptive. America's most serious error, he believes, was committing its armed forces to a war in which neither political nor military goals were ever fully articulated by our civilian leaders. Our armed forces, lacking clear objectives, failed to develop an appropriate strategy, instead relinquishing the offensive to Hanoi. Yet an achievable strategy could have been devised, Palmer believes. Moreover, our South Vietnamese allies could have been bolstered by appropriate aid but were instead overwhelmed by the massive American military presence. Compounding these errors were the flawed civilian and military chains of command. The result was defeat for America and disaster for South Vietnam. General Palmer presents here an insider's history of the war and an astute critique of America's military strengths and successes as well as its weaknesses and failures.Taal: Engels;Afmetingen: 15x229x152 mm;Gewicht: 392,00 gram;Verschijningsdatum: september 2002;ISBN10: 0813190363;ISBN13: 9780813190365; Engelstalig | Paperback | 2002.

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Von Händler/Antiquariat, Act 2 Books.
Simon & Schuster. Soft cover. 067161178X A very nice book from private collection. Clean, tight, square copy with only light used wear. A very nice copy over all. NOT Ex-Library. NOT Remainder. . Fine. 1984.

Lieferung aus: Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika, zzgl. Versandkosten, Verandgebiet: DOM.
Von Händler/Antiquariat, HPB-Sapphire, TX, Dallas, [RE:5].
Connecting readers with great books since 1972. Used books may not include companion materials, some shelf wear, may contain highlighting/notes, may not include cd-om or access codes. Customer service is our top priority! Paperback, Revised ed.

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Von Händler/Antiquariat, dimplerecords.
" On April 30, 1975, Saigon and the government of South Vietnam fell to the communist regime of North Vietnam, ending―for American military forces―exactly twenty-five year of courageous but unavailing struggle. This is not the story of how America became embroiled in a conflict in a small country half-way around the globe, nor of why our armed forces remained there so long after the futility of our efforts became obvious to many. It is the story of what went wrong there militarily, and why. The author is a professional soldier who experienced the Vietnam war in the field and in the highest command echelons. General Palmer's insights into the key events and decisions that shaped American's military role in Vietnam are uncommonly perceptive. America's most serious error, he believes, was committing its armed forces to a war in which neither political nor military goals were ever fully articulated by our civilian leaders. Our armed forces, lacking clear objectives, failed to develop an appropriate strategy, instead relinquishing the offensive to Hanoi. Yet an achievable strategy could have been devised, Palmer believes. Moreover, our South Vietnamese allies could have been bolstered by appropriate aid but were instead overwhelmed by the massive American military presence. Compounding these errors were the flawed civilian and military chains of command. The result was defeat for America and disaster for South Vietnam. General Palmer presents here an insider's history of the war and an astute critique of America's military strengths and successes as well as its weaknesses and failures. Paperback, Ausgabe: 4 Sub, Label: University Press of Kentucky, University Press of Kentucky, Produktgruppe: Book, Publiziert: 2002-09-17, Studio: University Press of Kentucky, Verkaufsrang: 1305605.

Lieferung aus: Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika, Usually ships in 1-2 business days.
Von Händler/Antiquariat, spectrumbooks.
" On April 30, 1975, Saigon and the government of South Vietnam fell to the communist regime of North Vietnam, ending―for American military forces―exactly twenty-five year of courageous but unavailing struggle. This is not the story of how America became embroiled in a conflict in a small country half-way around the globe, nor of why our armed forces remained there so long after the futility of our efforts became obvious to many. It is the story of what went wrong there militarily, and why. The author is a professional soldier who experienced the Vietnam war in the field and in the highest command echelons. General Palmer's insights into the key events and decisions that shaped American's military role in Vietnam are uncommonly perceptive. America's most serious error, he believes, was committing its armed forces to a war in which neither political nor military goals were ever fully articulated by our civilian leaders. Our armed forces, lacking clear objectives, failed to develop an appropriate strategy, instead relinquishing the offensive to Hanoi. Yet an achievable strategy could have been devised, Palmer believes. Moreover, our South Vietnamese allies could have been bolstered by appropriate aid but were instead overwhelmed by the massive American military presence. Compounding these errors were the flawed civilian and military chains of command. The result was defeat for America and disaster for South Vietnam. General Palmer presents here an insider's history of the war and an astute critique of America's military strengths and successes as well as its weaknesses and failures. Paperback, Ausgabe: 4 Sub, Label: University Press of Kentucky, University Press of Kentucky, Produktgruppe: Book, Publiziert: 2002-09-17, Studio: University Press of Kentucky, Verkaufsrang: 1305605.

Von Händler/Antiquariat, Harvest Moon Farm Book Cellar [5617884], New Braunfels, TX, U.S.A.
Book shows moderate wear/ spine tight, pages clean/ covers creased; faint stain on bottom of cover; moderate edge wear/ corners creased/ remainder mark on bottom of book/ several pages and page tips creased.

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Von Händler/Antiquariat, Ergodebooks.
Da Capo Press, 1990-03-21. Paperback. Very Good. Buy with confidence. Excellent Customer Service & Return policy. Ships Fast. 24*7 Customer Service.

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Von Händler/Antiquariat, Wonder Book.
Da Capo Press. Used - Very Good. Da Capo Press, 03/21/1990, Paperback, Very Good condition.