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100%: George Lekatis: Understanding Basel III, What Is Different After March 2014 (ISBN: 9781311527097) 2014, Smashwords Edition, Smashwords Edition, Smashwords Edition, in Englisch, auch als eBook.Nur diese Ausgabe anzeigen…
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81%: George Lekatis: Understanding Basel III, What is different after September 2013 (ISBN: 9781301071777) 2013, Smashwords Edition, Smashwords Edition, Smashwords Edition, in Englisch, auch als eBook.Nur diese Ausgabe anzeigen…
75%: George Lekatis: Understanding Basel III, What Is Different After July 2013 (ISBN: 9781301682683) 2013, Smashwords Edition, Smashwords Edition, Smashwords Edition, in Englisch, auch als eBook.Nur diese Ausgabe anzeigen…
75%: George Lekatis: Understanding Basel III, What is different after June 2013 (ISBN: 9781301305179) 2013, Smashwords Edition, Smashwords Edition, Smashwords Edition, in Englisch, auch als eBook.Nur diese Ausgabe anzeigen…
75%: George Lekatis: Understanding Basel III, What is different after May 2013 (ISBN: 9781301673292) 2013, Smashwords Edition, Smashwords Edition, Smashwords Edition, in Englisch, auch als eBook.Nur diese Ausgabe anzeigen…
75%: George Lekatis: Understanding Basel III, What is Different After December 2013 (ISBN: 9781311069962) 2013, Smashwords Edition, Smashwords Edition, Smashwords Edition, in Englisch, auch als eBook.Nur diese Ausgabe anzeigen…
75%: George Lekatis: Understanding Basel III, What is different after August 2013 (ISBN: 9781301503865) 2013, Smashwords Edition, Smashwords Edition, Smashwords Edition, in Englisch, auch als eBook.Nur diese Ausgabe anzeigen…
75%: George Lekatis: Understanding Basel III, What is different after April 2013 (ISBN: 9781301556618) 2013, Smashwords Edition, Smashwords Edition, Smashwords Edition, in Englisch, auch als eBook.Nur diese Ausgabe anzeigen…
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Understanding Basel III, What Is Different After March 2014
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Bester Preis: € 4,37 (vom 06.07.2016)1
Understanding Sarbanes-Oxley, What Is Different After July 2013 (2013)
EN NW EB DLISBN: 9781301402182 bzw. 1301402184, in Englisch, Smashwords Edition, Smashwords Edition, Smashwords Edition, neu, E-Book, elektronischer Download.
Lieferung aus: Kanada, in-stock.
Users log in, are dropped into a UNIX shell, and have all of the powers of multi-processor UNIX workstations at their disposal. We have users writing C++ code, AWK scripts, and PYTHON modules; each customizing their analyses to the specific task at hand, sharing scripts, and collaboratively building larger processes."This is interesting! Who said that?Gregg E. Berman, Associate Director, Office of Analytics and Research, Division of Trading and Markets, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.I was returning from the Raleigh Durham Airport, NC to JFK, NY. I had just led a class to the SAS Software campus in Cary (a great business environment).We were speaking about big data and big analytics, legal obligation for extreme information management and processing, for issues that reach or exceed the capability of IT systems. So, when I checked emails at the airport, and I received one from a colleague about the speech of Gregg E. Berman from the Office of Analytics and Research, Division of Trading and Markets, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, I was really interested in learning more about what is different now. Gregg continued:"The date was May 6, 2010. The time was 2:45 in the afternoon. And the S & P had just fallen 5% in only 5 minutes. Ten or so minutes later, it fully recovered. Thus was born what is now commonly known as the Flash Crash. Our job was to team up with the staff at the CFTC, figure out what happened, and write up a report as soon as possible. If not for a few car chases, this task was worthy of an episode of Mission Impossible. Given the interconnected nature of our markets, the first step in our analysis was to determine whether the Flash Crash was initially triggered by events in the cash equity markets or in the derivative futures markets. To perform such an analysis we unfortunately needed to fully reconstruct the order books for thousands of individual stocks -a process that involved building analytics to process billions of individual records and.
Users log in, are dropped into a UNIX shell, and have all of the powers of multi-processor UNIX workstations at their disposal. We have users writing C++ code, AWK scripts, and PYTHON modules; each customizing their analyses to the specific task at hand, sharing scripts, and collaboratively building larger processes."This is interesting! Who said that?Gregg E. Berman, Associate Director, Office of Analytics and Research, Division of Trading and Markets, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.I was returning from the Raleigh Durham Airport, NC to JFK, NY. I had just led a class to the SAS Software campus in Cary (a great business environment).We were speaking about big data and big analytics, legal obligation for extreme information management and processing, for issues that reach or exceed the capability of IT systems. So, when I checked emails at the airport, and I received one from a colleague about the speech of Gregg E. Berman from the Office of Analytics and Research, Division of Trading and Markets, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, I was really interested in learning more about what is different now. Gregg continued:"The date was May 6, 2010. The time was 2:45 in the afternoon. And the S & P had just fallen 5% in only 5 minutes. Ten or so minutes later, it fully recovered. Thus was born what is now commonly known as the Flash Crash. Our job was to team up with the staff at the CFTC, figure out what happened, and write up a report as soon as possible. If not for a few car chases, this task was worthy of an episode of Mission Impossible. Given the interconnected nature of our markets, the first step in our analysis was to determine whether the Flash Crash was initially triggered by events in the cash equity markets or in the derivative futures markets. To perform such an analysis we unfortunately needed to fully reconstruct the order books for thousands of individual stocks -a process that involved building analytics to process billions of individual records and.
2
Understanding Basel III, What is different after June 2013 (2013)
EN NW EB DLISBN: 9781301305179 bzw. 1301305170, in Englisch, Smashwords Edition, Smashwords Edition, Smashwords Edition, neu, E-Book, elektronischer Download.
Lieferung aus: Frankreich, in-stock.
His speech is interesting. We can even find more about meritocracy:"A meritocracy is a system in which the people who are the luckiest in their health and genetic endowment; luckiest in terms of family support, encouragement, and, probably, income; luckiest in their educational and career opportunities; and luckiest in so many other ways difficult to enumerate-these are the folks who reap the largest rewards. The only way for even a putative meritocracy to hope to pass ethical muster, to be considered fair, is if those who are the luckiest in all of those respects also have the greatest responsibility to work hard, to contribute to the betterment of the world, and to share their luck with others."Well, I will spend the weekend thinking about it, especially the methodology, how they will "share their luck with others".As a consultant, I must develop a step by step luck-sharing methodology (well, I think it is better to make it "principles-based" instead of "rules-based").I already have some ideas. The process will have 3 Pillars. Pillar 1: Luck Quantification. Pillar 2: Internal Luck Adequacy Assessment Process, and luck stress-testing. Pillar 3: Luck Transparency. It looks a bit like Basel iii. I know. According to the "if all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail" principle, we can use a Basel iii approach almost everywhere. We will use a Monte Carlo simulation to quantify the "luckiest in so many other ways difficult to enumerate" part, as Mr. Bernanke said. We will generate luck scenarios, we will find a probability weigted luck average, and we will calculate the LVaR ( Luck Value at Risk). Almost done. The following morning, I received an email. Title: "Forecasting is the art of saying what will happen, and then explaining why it didn't "Message: I hate you. Our boss is following your stress testing recommendations. Lao Tzu has said that those who have knowledge don't predict. Those who predict, don't have knowledge. Signature: TerminatorTerminator?Arnol.
His speech is interesting. We can even find more about meritocracy:"A meritocracy is a system in which the people who are the luckiest in their health and genetic endowment; luckiest in terms of family support, encouragement, and, probably, income; luckiest in their educational and career opportunities; and luckiest in so many other ways difficult to enumerate-these are the folks who reap the largest rewards. The only way for even a putative meritocracy to hope to pass ethical muster, to be considered fair, is if those who are the luckiest in all of those respects also have the greatest responsibility to work hard, to contribute to the betterment of the world, and to share their luck with others."Well, I will spend the weekend thinking about it, especially the methodology, how they will "share their luck with others".As a consultant, I must develop a step by step luck-sharing methodology (well, I think it is better to make it "principles-based" instead of "rules-based").I already have some ideas. The process will have 3 Pillars. Pillar 1: Luck Quantification. Pillar 2: Internal Luck Adequacy Assessment Process, and luck stress-testing. Pillar 3: Luck Transparency. It looks a bit like Basel iii. I know. According to the "if all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail" principle, we can use a Basel iii approach almost everywhere. We will use a Monte Carlo simulation to quantify the "luckiest in so many other ways difficult to enumerate" part, as Mr. Bernanke said. We will generate luck scenarios, we will find a probability weigted luck average, and we will calculate the LVaR ( Luck Value at Risk). Almost done. The following morning, I received an email. Title: "Forecasting is the art of saying what will happen, and then explaining why it didn't "Message: I hate you. Our boss is following your stress testing recommendations. Lao Tzu has said that those who have knowledge don't predict. Those who predict, don't have knowledge. Signature: TerminatorTerminator?Arnol.
3
Understanding Basel III, What is different after May 2013 (2013)
EN NW EB DLISBN: 9781301673292 bzw. 1301673293, in Englisch, Smashwords Edition, Smashwords Edition, Smashwords Edition, neu, E-Book, elektronischer Download.
Lieferung aus: Frankreich, in-stock.
I had a difficult time in the past to explain liquidity risk management and ratios. Now I know what to do. Problem solved!I will use a pollution-mitigating technology, like scrubbers to explain liquidity risk. Mr. Jeremy C Stein, Member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System explained how:"Suppose we have a power plant that produces energy and, as a byproduct, some pollution. Suppose further that regulators want to reduce the pollution and have two tools at their disposal: They can mandate the use of a pollution-mitigating technology, like scrubbers, or they can levy a tax on the amount of pollution generated by the plant. In an ideal world, regulation would accomplish two objectives. First, it would lead to an optimal level of mitigation - that is, it would induce the plant to install scrubbers up to the point where the cost of an additional scrubber is equal to the marginal social benefit, in terms of reduced pollution. And, second, it would also promote conservation: Given that the scrubbers don't get rid of pollution entirely, one also wants to reduce overall energy consumption by making it more expensive.A simple case is one in which the costs of installing scrubbers, as well as the social benefits of reduced pollution, are known in advance by the regulator and the manager of the power plant. In this case, the regulator can figure out what the right number of scrubbers is and require that the plant install these scrubbers. The mandate can therefore precisely target the optimal amount of mitigation per unit of energy produced. And, to the extent that the scrubbers are costly, the mandate will also lead to higher energy prices, which will encourage some conservation, though perhaps not the socially optimal level. This latter effect is the implicit tax aspect of the mandate.A more complicated case is when the regulator does not know ahead of time what the costs of building and installing scrubbers will be. Here, mandating the use of a fixed number of scrubbers.
I had a difficult time in the past to explain liquidity risk management and ratios. Now I know what to do. Problem solved!I will use a pollution-mitigating technology, like scrubbers to explain liquidity risk. Mr. Jeremy C Stein, Member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System explained how:"Suppose we have a power plant that produces energy and, as a byproduct, some pollution. Suppose further that regulators want to reduce the pollution and have two tools at their disposal: They can mandate the use of a pollution-mitigating technology, like scrubbers, or they can levy a tax on the amount of pollution generated by the plant. In an ideal world, regulation would accomplish two objectives. First, it would lead to an optimal level of mitigation - that is, it would induce the plant to install scrubbers up to the point where the cost of an additional scrubber is equal to the marginal social benefit, in terms of reduced pollution. And, second, it would also promote conservation: Given that the scrubbers don't get rid of pollution entirely, one also wants to reduce overall energy consumption by making it more expensive.A simple case is one in which the costs of installing scrubbers, as well as the social benefits of reduced pollution, are known in advance by the regulator and the manager of the power plant. In this case, the regulator can figure out what the right number of scrubbers is and require that the plant install these scrubbers. The mandate can therefore precisely target the optimal amount of mitigation per unit of energy produced. And, to the extent that the scrubbers are costly, the mandate will also lead to higher energy prices, which will encourage some conservation, though perhaps not the socially optimal level. This latter effect is the implicit tax aspect of the mandate.A more complicated case is when the regulator does not know ahead of time what the costs of building and installing scrubbers will be. Here, mandating the use of a fixed number of scrubbers.
4
Understanding Basel III, What is different after August 2013 (2013)
EN NW EB DLISBN: 9781301503865 bzw. 130150386X, in Englisch, Smashwords Edition, Smashwords Edition, Smashwords Edition, neu, E-Book, elektronischer Download.
Lieferung aus: Frankreich, in-stock.
Will you try to satisfy your microprudential or your macroprudential supervisors today?What? You want to satisfy both?It is not that easy. The moment we satisfy the microprudential supervisors, the macroprudential ones worry about the. stability of the system!I was travelling from Australia, where I led a class to ANZ bank, to Kuala Lumpur, where I would lead a class organized by the Institute of Bankers in Malaysia (IBBM), when I read the excellent paper we have at Number 1 our list this week."The mandatory move to clearing standardised over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives trades via CCPs will HELP to reduce counterparty risk between financial institutions, PROMOTE transparency in hitherto opaque OTC derivatives markets and FACILITATE a more orderly resolution of failing financial institutions. HOWEVER, the more prominent role of CCPs will also introduce NEW systemic risks. Mandatory clearing will turn CCPs into systemic nodes in the financial system, with unknown, but possibly far-reaching, consequences. For example, systemic risks may be exacerbated by the procyclicality of CCPs' practices, as they tend to tighten collateral requirements during an economic downturn. This, in turn, may fuel the creation of adverse feedback loops in financial markets and possibly trigger asset fire sales."WhatOk, I will try to understand it. We try to have stability in the financial markets. to introduce countercyclical measures to satisfy the Basel iii rules and the microprudential supervisors. to reduce counterparty risk. SO we have a mandatory move to clearing standardised over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives trades via CCPs. that solves some microprudential problems. but alerts the macroprudential supervisors. as it has "unknown, but possibly far-reaching, consequences" . exacerbated by the PROcyclicality of CCPs' practices (oh no) . that possibly trigger asset fire sales. and financial stability problems.
Will you try to satisfy your microprudential or your macroprudential supervisors today?What? You want to satisfy both?It is not that easy. The moment we satisfy the microprudential supervisors, the macroprudential ones worry about the. stability of the system!I was travelling from Australia, where I led a class to ANZ bank, to Kuala Lumpur, where I would lead a class organized by the Institute of Bankers in Malaysia (IBBM), when I read the excellent paper we have at Number 1 our list this week."The mandatory move to clearing standardised over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives trades via CCPs will HELP to reduce counterparty risk between financial institutions, PROMOTE transparency in hitherto opaque OTC derivatives markets and FACILITATE a more orderly resolution of failing financial institutions. HOWEVER, the more prominent role of CCPs will also introduce NEW systemic risks. Mandatory clearing will turn CCPs into systemic nodes in the financial system, with unknown, but possibly far-reaching, consequences. For example, systemic risks may be exacerbated by the procyclicality of CCPs' practices, as they tend to tighten collateral requirements during an economic downturn. This, in turn, may fuel the creation of adverse feedback loops in financial markets and possibly trigger asset fire sales."WhatOk, I will try to understand it. We try to have stability in the financial markets. to introduce countercyclical measures to satisfy the Basel iii rules and the microprudential supervisors. to reduce counterparty risk. SO we have a mandatory move to clearing standardised over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives trades via CCPs. that solves some microprudential problems. but alerts the macroprudential supervisors. as it has "unknown, but possibly far-reaching, consequences" . exacerbated by the PROcyclicality of CCPs' practices (oh no) . that possibly trigger asset fire sales. and financial stability problems.
5
Understanding Basel III, What Is Different After July 2013 (2013)
EN NW EB DLISBN: 9781301682683 bzw. 1301682683, in Englisch, Smashwords Edition, Smashwords Edition, Smashwords Edition, neu, E-Book, elektronischer Download.
Lieferung aus: Frankreich, in-stock.
Changes. Changes. We have a very interesting definition of the leverage ratio from the Basel Committee:"The Basel III leverage ratio is defined as the Capital Measure (the numerator) divided by the Exposure Measure (the denominator), with this ratio expressed as a percentage."The basis of calculation is the average of the three month-end leverage ratios over a quarter. The Committee will continue to test a minimum requirement of 3% for the leverage ratio during the parallel run period (ie from 1 January 2013 to 1 January 2017)."A bank's total Exposure Measure is the sum of the following exposures:(a) on-balance sheet exposures,(b) derivative exposures,(c) securities financing transaction exposures, and(d) other off-balance sheet exposures. Interesting. Read more below. Another interesting definition:"Shadow banking refers to a set of activities outside the formal banking system that carry out similar functions to those performed by banks. While the term "shadow banking" tends to suggest something secretive or illicit, I will argue that, on the whole, shadow banking serves a useful purpose. At the same time, the experience during the global financial crisis revealed that shadow banking has some important fragilities."These are remarks by Mr. Timothy Lane, Deputy Governor of the Bank of Canada. Read more. below. Let's go to Europe.I have spent days trying to understand the different approaches and agendas for the integration of the European Economic Community / European Community / European Union: Supranationalism vs. Intergovernmentalism vs. Federalism vs. .We have some interesting news: In the opinion of Bundesbank Deputy President Sabine Lautenschläger, current European law is not suited to creating a legally stable banking union in Europe. At an event hosted in Dublin by the Institute of International and European Affairs (IIEA), an Irish think-tank, she called for changes to the EU treaties in order to make banking supervision and the mechanism for resolving ail.
Changes. Changes. We have a very interesting definition of the leverage ratio from the Basel Committee:"The Basel III leverage ratio is defined as the Capital Measure (the numerator) divided by the Exposure Measure (the denominator), with this ratio expressed as a percentage."The basis of calculation is the average of the three month-end leverage ratios over a quarter. The Committee will continue to test a minimum requirement of 3% for the leverage ratio during the parallel run period (ie from 1 January 2013 to 1 January 2017)."A bank's total Exposure Measure is the sum of the following exposures:(a) on-balance sheet exposures,(b) derivative exposures,(c) securities financing transaction exposures, and(d) other off-balance sheet exposures. Interesting. Read more below. Another interesting definition:"Shadow banking refers to a set of activities outside the formal banking system that carry out similar functions to those performed by banks. While the term "shadow banking" tends to suggest something secretive or illicit, I will argue that, on the whole, shadow banking serves a useful purpose. At the same time, the experience during the global financial crisis revealed that shadow banking has some important fragilities."These are remarks by Mr. Timothy Lane, Deputy Governor of the Bank of Canada. Read more. below. Let's go to Europe.I have spent days trying to understand the different approaches and agendas for the integration of the European Economic Community / European Community / European Union: Supranationalism vs. Intergovernmentalism vs. Federalism vs. .We have some interesting news: In the opinion of Bundesbank Deputy President Sabine Lautenschläger, current European law is not suited to creating a legally stable banking union in Europe. At an event hosted in Dublin by the Institute of International and European Affairs (IIEA), an Irish think-tank, she called for changes to the EU treaties in order to make banking supervision and the mechanism for resolving ail.
6
Understanding Basel iii: What Is Different After March 2013 (2013)
EN NW EB DLISBN: 9781301286959 bzw. 1301286958, in Englisch, Smashwords Edition, Smashwords Edition, Smashwords Edition, neu, E-Book, elektronischer Download.
Lieferung aus: Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika, in-stock.
Welcome to the Basel iii news and alerts from the Basel iii Compliance Professionals Association (BiiiCPA).Amazing: You must see the average salary and the demand for Basel III skills. Also, there is still a great deal of work being done to finish the Basel III framework. Read what is missing and when we are expecting new developments.
Welcome to the Basel iii news and alerts from the Basel iii Compliance Professionals Association (BiiiCPA).Amazing: You must see the average salary and the demand for Basel III skills. Also, there is still a great deal of work being done to finish the Basel III framework. Read what is missing and when we are expecting new developments.
7
Understanding Basel III, What is different after September 2013 (2013)
EN NW EB DLISBN: 9781301071777 bzw. 1301071773, in Englisch, Smashwords Edition, Smashwords Edition, Smashwords Edition, neu, E-Book, elektronischer Download.
Lieferung aus: Frankreich, in-stock.
According to the supply and demand concept, in a competitive market, the price for a particular service will vary until it settles at a point where the quantity demanded will equal the quantity supplied, resulting in an economic equilibrium for price and quantity. Well, which is the "economic equilibrium" in Basel III jobs? You may look at the graphs:(http://www. itjobswatch. co. uk/jobs/uk/basel%20iii. do)We see that the average salary for Basel iii jobs in UK was GBP 90,000 (we know many professionals and experts that made real money in the early implementation phase of Basel III).Now the average salary is GBP 77,500. Not too bad, as my friends from UK use to say. What about other compliance jobs?The average salary in quality assurance and compliance in UK is GBP 47,500.Interesting Job Descriptions, Location: Greater LondonRegulatory COREP Analyst (BASEL III) - 6 Month ContractMy client, a market leading financial software organisation based in Central London, is currently recruiting for a test Preparation Consultant to join their highly successful and expanding team. My client is an extremely well reputed organisation with a strong customer base and track record and this is a fantastic opportunity to join the team at the early stages of an exciting software development project. Main responsibility: Identifying appropriate test scenarios and test data (ie given the information to be reported on a particular COREP template, identifying the set of financial products that will be relevant, and the various combinations of test data that will be required to ensure good test coverage) Selecting representative transactions from our existing test database (or defining new test transactions if necessary) Specifying suitable data values for the additional data attributes that the new/amended reporting requirements need (ie "enrich" the existing test transactions to ensure they contain all the data required to drive the functional testing of the new/amended COREP templates).The data.
According to the supply and demand concept, in a competitive market, the price for a particular service will vary until it settles at a point where the quantity demanded will equal the quantity supplied, resulting in an economic equilibrium for price and quantity. Well, which is the "economic equilibrium" in Basel III jobs? You may look at the graphs:(http://www. itjobswatch. co. uk/jobs/uk/basel%20iii. do)We see that the average salary for Basel iii jobs in UK was GBP 90,000 (we know many professionals and experts that made real money in the early implementation phase of Basel III).Now the average salary is GBP 77,500. Not too bad, as my friends from UK use to say. What about other compliance jobs?The average salary in quality assurance and compliance in UK is GBP 47,500.Interesting Job Descriptions, Location: Greater LondonRegulatory COREP Analyst (BASEL III) - 6 Month ContractMy client, a market leading financial software organisation based in Central London, is currently recruiting for a test Preparation Consultant to join their highly successful and expanding team. My client is an extremely well reputed organisation with a strong customer base and track record and this is a fantastic opportunity to join the team at the early stages of an exciting software development project. Main responsibility: Identifying appropriate test scenarios and test data (ie given the information to be reported on a particular COREP template, identifying the set of financial products that will be relevant, and the various combinations of test data that will be required to ensure good test coverage) Selecting representative transactions from our existing test database (or defining new test transactions if necessary) Specifying suitable data values for the additional data attributes that the new/amended reporting requirements need (ie "enrich" the existing test transactions to ensure they contain all the data required to drive the functional testing of the new/amended COREP templates).The data.
8
Understanding Sarbanes-Oxley, What is different after May 2013 (2013)
EN NW EB DLISBN: 9781301418930 bzw. 1301418935, in Englisch, Smashwords Edition, Smashwords Edition, Smashwords Edition, neu, E-Book, elektronischer Download.
Lieferung aus: Kanada, in-stock.
Which is the difference between triggers and vulnerabilities?Dear Mr Bernanke, can you clarify please?He did, at the 49th Annual Conference on Bank Structure and Competition sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois. He said:"To respond to this point, I will distinguish, as I have elsewhere, between triggers and vulnerabilities. The triggers of any crisis are the particular events that touch off the crisis-the proximate causes, if you will. For the 2007-09 crisis, a prominent trigger was the losses suffered by holders of subprime mortgages. In contrast, the vulnerabilities associated with a crisis are preexisting features of the financial system that amplify and propagate the initial shocks. Examples of vulnerabilities include high levels of leverage, maturity transformation, interconnectedness, and complexity, all of which have the potential to magnify shocks to the financial system. Absent vulnerabilities, triggers might produce sizable losses to certain firms, investors, or asset classes but would generally not lead to full-blown financial crises; the collapse of the relatively small market for subprime mortgages, for example, would not have been nearly as consequential without preexisting fragilities in securitization practices and short-term funding markets which greatly increased its impact."Did you address vulnerabilities this week?Mr Bernanke continued:"Moreover, attempts to address specific vulnerabilities can be supplemented by broader measures-such as requiring banks to hold more capital and liquidity-that make the system more resilient to a range of shocks.
Which is the difference between triggers and vulnerabilities?Dear Mr Bernanke, can you clarify please?He did, at the 49th Annual Conference on Bank Structure and Competition sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois. He said:"To respond to this point, I will distinguish, as I have elsewhere, between triggers and vulnerabilities. The triggers of any crisis are the particular events that touch off the crisis-the proximate causes, if you will. For the 2007-09 crisis, a prominent trigger was the losses suffered by holders of subprime mortgages. In contrast, the vulnerabilities associated with a crisis are preexisting features of the financial system that amplify and propagate the initial shocks. Examples of vulnerabilities include high levels of leverage, maturity transformation, interconnectedness, and complexity, all of which have the potential to magnify shocks to the financial system. Absent vulnerabilities, triggers might produce sizable losses to certain firms, investors, or asset classes but would generally not lead to full-blown financial crises; the collapse of the relatively small market for subprime mortgages, for example, would not have been nearly as consequential without preexisting fragilities in securitization practices and short-term funding markets which greatly increased its impact."Did you address vulnerabilities this week?Mr Bernanke continued:"Moreover, attempts to address specific vulnerabilities can be supplemented by broader measures-such as requiring banks to hold more capital and liquidity-that make the system more resilient to a range of shocks.
9
Understanding Basel III, What is different after April 2013 (2013)
EN NW EB DLISBN: 9781301556618 bzw. 1301556610, in Englisch, Smashwords Edition, Smashwords Edition, Smashwords Edition, neu, E-Book, elektronischer Download.
Lieferung aus: Kanada, in-stock.
Auditors. it is your turn to suffer the consequences of the crisis. According to the BIS, The recent financial crisis not only revealed weaknesses in risk management, control and governance processes at banks, but also highlighted the need to improve the quality of external audits of banks. Given the central role banks play in contributing to financial stability, and therefore the need for market confidence in the quality of external audits of banks' financial statements, the Basel Committee is issuing for consultation this guidance on external audits of banks. This document describes, through sixteen principles and explanatory guidance, supervisory expectations regarding audit quality and how that relates to the external auditor's work in a bank.
Auditors. it is your turn to suffer the consequences of the crisis. According to the BIS, The recent financial crisis not only revealed weaknesses in risk management, control and governance processes at banks, but also highlighted the need to improve the quality of external audits of banks. Given the central role banks play in contributing to financial stability, and therefore the need for market confidence in the quality of external audits of banks' financial statements, the Basel Committee is issuing for consultation this guidance on external audits of banks. This document describes, through sixteen principles and explanatory guidance, supervisory expectations regarding audit quality and how that relates to the external auditor's work in a bank.
10
Understanding Basel III, What Is Different After March 2014 (2014)
EN NW EB DLISBN: 9781311527097 bzw. 1311527095, in Englisch, Smashwords Edition, Smashwords Edition, Smashwords Edition, neu, E-Book, elektronischer Download.
Lieferung aus: Frankreich, in-stock.
The House of Lords EU Sub-Committee on Economic and Financial Affairs has published its report looking at EU proposals for rescuing failing banks, describing them as inadequately funded, overly complicated and politically unrealistic. ReportThe report, entitled 'Genuine Economic and Monetary Union' and the implications for the UK also calls on the UK Government to get strongly involved in the plans. As the eurozone moves towards closer integration the UK will need to work hard to influence the debate, which it needs to do for its own good, for the good of the City of London, and the good of all 28 members of the EU. FindingsOther findings of the report include:- Banking Union is vital to the success of the EU plans, but the proposed resolution mechanism for dealing with failing banks is not fit for purpose- Financial stability can only be achieved through a common deposit guarantee scheme, but these plans are dead in the water- Without a workable banking union, the vicious circle linking bank debt and sovereign debt will not be broken- Although politically remote, the eurozone's safety could require both debt mutualisation and a system of financial transfers- The Committee welcomes the decisive action taken by the European Central Bank to tackle the eurozone crisis, but warns that its credibility as bank supervisor must not be jeopardised as it undertakes its comprehensive assessment of the banking system. Commenting on the report, Lord Harrison, chair of the Committee, said:"We commend the achievements so far of the Commission in its journey towards Banking Union, in particular in establishing the ECB as a single supervisory body. However, we remain concerned that the proposals for pulling banks back from the edge are deeply flawed. The bailout mechanism is underfunded and it's too cumbersome to react speedily enough to a crisis. On top of that the prospect of ensuring a common eurozone guarantee for depositors' money has disappeared from view completely."The UK Gove.
The House of Lords EU Sub-Committee on Economic and Financial Affairs has published its report looking at EU proposals for rescuing failing banks, describing them as inadequately funded, overly complicated and politically unrealistic. ReportThe report, entitled 'Genuine Economic and Monetary Union' and the implications for the UK also calls on the UK Government to get strongly involved in the plans. As the eurozone moves towards closer integration the UK will need to work hard to influence the debate, which it needs to do for its own good, for the good of the City of London, and the good of all 28 members of the EU. FindingsOther findings of the report include:- Banking Union is vital to the success of the EU plans, but the proposed resolution mechanism for dealing with failing banks is not fit for purpose- Financial stability can only be achieved through a common deposit guarantee scheme, but these plans are dead in the water- Without a workable banking union, the vicious circle linking bank debt and sovereign debt will not be broken- Although politically remote, the eurozone's safety could require both debt mutualisation and a system of financial transfers- The Committee welcomes the decisive action taken by the European Central Bank to tackle the eurozone crisis, but warns that its credibility as bank supervisor must not be jeopardised as it undertakes its comprehensive assessment of the banking system. Commenting on the report, Lord Harrison, chair of the Committee, said:"We commend the achievements so far of the Commission in its journey towards Banking Union, in particular in establishing the ECB as a single supervisory body. However, we remain concerned that the proposals for pulling banks back from the edge are deeply flawed. The bailout mechanism is underfunded and it's too cumbersome to react speedily enough to a crisis. On top of that the prospect of ensuring a common eurozone guarantee for depositors' money has disappeared from view completely."The UK Gove.
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