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100%: Kieran Setiya: Reasons without Rationalism (ISBN: 9781400827725) 2009, in Englisch, auch als eBook.Nur diese Ausgabe anzeigen…
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Reasons without Rationalism (2009)
EN NW EBISBN: 9781400827725 bzw. 1400827728, in Englisch, Princeton University Press, neu, E-Book.
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Modern philosophy has been vexed by the question "Why should I be moral?" and by doubts about the rational authority of moral virtue. In Reasons without Rationalism, Kieran Setiya shows that these doubts rest on a mistake. The "should" of practical reason cannot be understood apart from the virtues of character, including such moral virtues as justice and benevolence, and the considerations to which the virtues make one sensitive thereby count as reasons to act. Proposing a new framework for de... Modern philosophy has been vexed by the question "Why should I be moral?" and by doubts about the rational authority of moral virtue. In Reasons without Rationalism, Kieran Setiya shows that these doubts rest on a mistake. The "should" of practical reason cannot be understood apart from the virtues of character, including such moral virtues as justice and benevolence, and the considerations to which the virtues make one sensitive thereby count as reasons to act. Proposing a new framework for debates about practical reason, Setiya argues that the only alternative to this "virtue theory" is a form of ethical rationalism in which reasons derive from the nature of intentional action. Despite its recent popularity, however, ethical rationalism is false. It wrongly assumes that we act "under the guise of the good," or it relies on dubious views about intention and motivation. It follows from the failure of rationalism that the virtue theory is true: we cannot be fully good without the perfection of practical reason, or have that perfection without being good. Addressing such topics as the psychology of virtue and the explanation of action, Reasons without Rationalism is essential reading for philosophers interested in ethics, rationality, or the philosophy of mind. Productinformatie:Soort: Met illustraties;Taal: Engels;Formaat: ePub met kopieerbeveiliging (DRM) van Adobe;Bestandsgrootte: 0.56 MB;Kopieerrechten: Het kopiëren van (delen van) de pagina's is niet toegestaan ;Printrechten: Het printen van (delen van) de pagina's is maximaal 3 keer toegestaan binnen 2 dag(en);Voorleesfunctie: De voorleesfunctie is uitgeschakeld;Geschikt voor: Alle e-readers te koop bij bol.com (of compatible met Adobe DRM). Telefoons/tablets met Google Android (1.6 of hoger) voorzien van bol.com boekenbol app. PC en Mac met Adobe reader software;ISBN10: 1400827728;ISBN13: 9781400827725;Product breedte: 159 mm;Product hoogte: 13 mm;Product lengte: 241 mm; Engels | Ebook | 2009.
bol.com.
Modern philosophy has been vexed by the question "Why should I be moral?" and by doubts about the rational authority of moral virtue. In Reasons without Rationalism, Kieran Setiya shows that these doubts rest on a mistake. The "should" of practical reason cannot be understood apart from the virtues of character, including such moral virtues as justice and benevolence, and the considerations to which the virtues make one sensitive thereby count as reasons to act. Proposing a new framework for de... Modern philosophy has been vexed by the question "Why should I be moral?" and by doubts about the rational authority of moral virtue. In Reasons without Rationalism, Kieran Setiya shows that these doubts rest on a mistake. The "should" of practical reason cannot be understood apart from the virtues of character, including such moral virtues as justice and benevolence, and the considerations to which the virtues make one sensitive thereby count as reasons to act. Proposing a new framework for debates about practical reason, Setiya argues that the only alternative to this "virtue theory" is a form of ethical rationalism in which reasons derive from the nature of intentional action. Despite its recent popularity, however, ethical rationalism is false. It wrongly assumes that we act "under the guise of the good," or it relies on dubious views about intention and motivation. It follows from the failure of rationalism that the virtue theory is true: we cannot be fully good without the perfection of practical reason, or have that perfection without being good. Addressing such topics as the psychology of virtue and the explanation of action, Reasons without Rationalism is essential reading for philosophers interested in ethics, rationality, or the philosophy of mind. Productinformatie:Soort: Met illustraties;Taal: Engels;Formaat: ePub met kopieerbeveiliging (DRM) van Adobe;Bestandsgrootte: 0.56 MB;Kopieerrechten: Het kopiëren van (delen van) de pagina's is niet toegestaan ;Printrechten: Het printen van (delen van) de pagina's is maximaal 3 keer toegestaan binnen 2 dag(en);Voorleesfunctie: De voorleesfunctie is uitgeschakeld;Geschikt voor: Alle e-readers te koop bij bol.com (of compatible met Adobe DRM). Telefoons/tablets met Google Android (1.6 of hoger) voorzien van bol.com boekenbol app. PC en Mac met Adobe reader software;ISBN10: 1400827728;ISBN13: 9781400827725;Product breedte: 159 mm;Product hoogte: 13 mm;Product lengte: 241 mm; Engels | Ebook | 2009.
2
Reasons without Rationalism (2009)
EN NW EB DLISBN: 9781400827725 bzw. 1400827728, in Englisch, Princeton University Press, Princeton University Press, Princeton University Press, neu, E-Book, elektronischer Download.
Lieferung aus: Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika, in-stock.
Modern philosophy has been vexed by the question "Why should I be moral?" and by doubts about the rational authority of moral virtue. In Reasons without Rationalism, Kieran Setiya shows that these doubts rest on a mistake. The "should" of practical reason cannot be understood apart from the virtues of character, including such moral virtues as justice and benevolence, and the considerations to which the virtues make one sensitive thereby count as reasons to act. Proposing a new framework for debates about practical reason, Setiya argues that the only alternative to this "virtue theory" is a form of ethical rationalism in which reasons derive from the nature of intentional action. Despite its recent popularity, however, ethical rationalism is false. It wrongly assumes that we act "under the guise of the good," or it relies on dubious views about intention and motivation. It follows from the failure of rationalism that the virtue theory is true: we cannot be fully good without the perfection of practical reason, or have that perfection without being good. Addressing such topics as the psychology of virtue and the explanation of action, Reasons without Rationalism is essential reading for philosophers interested in ethics, rationality, or the philosophy of mind.
Modern philosophy has been vexed by the question "Why should I be moral?" and by doubts about the rational authority of moral virtue. In Reasons without Rationalism, Kieran Setiya shows that these doubts rest on a mistake. The "should" of practical reason cannot be understood apart from the virtues of character, including such moral virtues as justice and benevolence, and the considerations to which the virtues make one sensitive thereby count as reasons to act. Proposing a new framework for debates about practical reason, Setiya argues that the only alternative to this "virtue theory" is a form of ethical rationalism in which reasons derive from the nature of intentional action. Despite its recent popularity, however, ethical rationalism is false. It wrongly assumes that we act "under the guise of the good," or it relies on dubious views about intention and motivation. It follows from the failure of rationalism that the virtue theory is true: we cannot be fully good without the perfection of practical reason, or have that perfection without being good. Addressing such topics as the psychology of virtue and the explanation of action, Reasons without Rationalism is essential reading for philosophers interested in ethics, rationality, or the philosophy of mind.
3
Reasons without Rationalism
EN NW EBISBN: 9780691127491 bzw. 0691127492, in Englisch, Princeton University Press, neu, E-Book.
Lieferung aus: Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika, E-Book zum download.
Philosophy, Modern philosophy has been vexed by the question "Why should I be moral?" and by doubts about the rational authority of moral virtue. In Reasons without Rationalism , Kieran Setiya shows that these doubts rest on a mistake. The "should" of practical reason cannot be understood apart from the virtues of character, including such moral virtues as justice and benevolence, and the considerations to which the virtues make one sensitive thereby count as reasons to act. Proposing a new framework for debates about practical reason, Setiya argues that the only alternative to this "virtue theory" is a form of ethical rationalism in which reasons derive from the nature of intentional action. Despite its recent popularity, however, ethical rationalism is false. It wrongly assumes that we act "under the guise of the good," or it relies on dubious views about intention and motivation. It follows from the failure of rationalism that the virtue theory is true: we cannot be fully good without the perfection of practical reason, or have that perfection without being good. Addressing such topics as the psychology of virtue and the explanation of action, Reasons without Rationalism is essential reading for philosophers interested in ethics, rationality, or the philosophy of mind.
Philosophy, Modern philosophy has been vexed by the question "Why should I be moral?" and by doubts about the rational authority of moral virtue. In Reasons without Rationalism , Kieran Setiya shows that these doubts rest on a mistake. The "should" of practical reason cannot be understood apart from the virtues of character, including such moral virtues as justice and benevolence, and the considerations to which the virtues make one sensitive thereby count as reasons to act. Proposing a new framework for debates about practical reason, Setiya argues that the only alternative to this "virtue theory" is a form of ethical rationalism in which reasons derive from the nature of intentional action. Despite its recent popularity, however, ethical rationalism is false. It wrongly assumes that we act "under the guise of the good," or it relies on dubious views about intention and motivation. It follows from the failure of rationalism that the virtue theory is true: we cannot be fully good without the perfection of practical reason, or have that perfection without being good. Addressing such topics as the psychology of virtue and the explanation of action, Reasons without Rationalism is essential reading for philosophers interested in ethics, rationality, or the philosophy of mind.
4
Reasons without Rationalism (2007)
EN HC USISBN: 9780691127491 bzw. 0691127492, in Englisch, 160 Seiten, Princeton University Press, gebundenes Buch, gebraucht.
Lieferung aus: Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika, Usually ships in 1-2 business days.
Von Händler/Antiquariat, HPB-Flagship.
Modern philosophy has been vexed by the question "Why should I be moral?" and by doubts about the rational authority of moral virtue. In Reasons without Rationalism, Kieran Setiya shows that these doubts rest on a mistake. The "should" of practical reason cannot be understood apart from the virtues of character, including such moral virtues as justice and benevolence, and the considerations to which the virtues make one sensitive thereby count as reasons to act. Proposing a new framework for debates about practical reason, Setiya argues that the only alternative to this "virtue theory" is a form of ethical rationalism in which reasons derive from the nature of intentional action. Despite its recent popularity, however, ethical rationalism is false. It wrongly assumes that we act "under the guise of the good," or it relies on dubious views about intention and motivation. It follows from the failure of rationalism that the virtue theory is true: we cannot be fully good without the perfection of practical reason, or have that perfection without being good. Addressing such topics as the psychology of virtue and the explanation of action, Reasons without Rationalism is essential reading for philosophers interested in ethics, rationality, or the philosophy of mind. , Hardcover, Label: Princeton University Press, Princeton University Press, Produktgruppe: Book, Publiziert: 2007-01-22, Studio: Princeton University Press, Verkaufsrang: 1928719.
Von Händler/Antiquariat, HPB-Flagship.
Modern philosophy has been vexed by the question "Why should I be moral?" and by doubts about the rational authority of moral virtue. In Reasons without Rationalism, Kieran Setiya shows that these doubts rest on a mistake. The "should" of practical reason cannot be understood apart from the virtues of character, including such moral virtues as justice and benevolence, and the considerations to which the virtues make one sensitive thereby count as reasons to act. Proposing a new framework for debates about practical reason, Setiya argues that the only alternative to this "virtue theory" is a form of ethical rationalism in which reasons derive from the nature of intentional action. Despite its recent popularity, however, ethical rationalism is false. It wrongly assumes that we act "under the guise of the good," or it relies on dubious views about intention and motivation. It follows from the failure of rationalism that the virtue theory is true: we cannot be fully good without the perfection of practical reason, or have that perfection without being good. Addressing such topics as the psychology of virtue and the explanation of action, Reasons without Rationalism is essential reading for philosophers interested in ethics, rationality, or the philosophy of mind. , Hardcover, Label: Princeton University Press, Princeton University Press, Produktgruppe: Book, Publiziert: 2007-01-22, Studio: Princeton University Press, Verkaufsrang: 1928719.
5
Reasons without Rationalism (2007)
EN HC NWISBN: 9780691127491 bzw. 0691127492, in Englisch, 160 Seiten, Princeton University Press, gebundenes Buch, neu.
Lieferung aus: Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika, Usually ships in 1-2 business days.
Von Händler/Antiquariat, indoobestsellers.
Modern philosophy has been vexed by the question "Why should I be moral?" and by doubts about the rational authority of moral virtue. In Reasons without Rationalism, Kieran Setiya shows that these doubts rest on a mistake. The "should" of practical reason cannot be understood apart from the virtues of character, including such moral virtues as justice and benevolence, and the considerations to which the virtues make one sensitive thereby count as reasons to act. Proposing a new framework for debates about practical reason, Setiya argues that the only alternative to this "virtue theory" is a form of ethical rationalism in which reasons derive from the nature of intentional action. Despite its recent popularity, however, ethical rationalism is false. It wrongly assumes that we act "under the guise of the good," or it relies on dubious views about intention and motivation. It follows from the failure of rationalism that the virtue theory is true: we cannot be fully good without the perfection of practical reason, or have that perfection without being good. Addressing such topics as the psychology of virtue and the explanation of action, Reasons without Rationalism is essential reading for philosophers interested in ethics, rationality, or the philosophy of mind. , Hardcover, Label: Princeton University Press, Princeton University Press, Produktgruppe: Book, Publiziert: 2007-01-22, Studio: Princeton University Press, Verkaufsrang: 1928719.
Von Händler/Antiquariat, indoobestsellers.
Modern philosophy has been vexed by the question "Why should I be moral?" and by doubts about the rational authority of moral virtue. In Reasons without Rationalism, Kieran Setiya shows that these doubts rest on a mistake. The "should" of practical reason cannot be understood apart from the virtues of character, including such moral virtues as justice and benevolence, and the considerations to which the virtues make one sensitive thereby count as reasons to act. Proposing a new framework for debates about practical reason, Setiya argues that the only alternative to this "virtue theory" is a form of ethical rationalism in which reasons derive from the nature of intentional action. Despite its recent popularity, however, ethical rationalism is false. It wrongly assumes that we act "under the guise of the good," or it relies on dubious views about intention and motivation. It follows from the failure of rationalism that the virtue theory is true: we cannot be fully good without the perfection of practical reason, or have that perfection without being good. Addressing such topics as the psychology of virtue and the explanation of action, Reasons without Rationalism is essential reading for philosophers interested in ethics, rationality, or the philosophy of mind. , Hardcover, Label: Princeton University Press, Princeton University Press, Produktgruppe: Book, Publiziert: 2007-01-22, Studio: Princeton University Press, Verkaufsrang: 1928719.
6
Reasons without Rationalism (2010)
EN PB NWISBN: 9780691146522 bzw. 0691146527, in Englisch, 144 Seiten, Princeton University Press, Taschenbuch, neu.
Lieferung aus: Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika, Usually ships in 2-3 business days.
Von Händler/Antiquariat, TOTAL BOOKS.
Modern philosophy has been vexed by the question "Why should I be moral?" and by doubts about the rational authority of moral virtue. In Reasons without Rationalism, Kieran Setiya shows that these doubts rest on a mistake. The "should" of practical reason cannot be understood apart from the virtues of character, including such moral virtues as justice and benevolence, and the considerations to which the virtues make one sensitive thereby count as reasons to act. Proposing a new framework for debates about practical reason, Setiya argues that the only alternative to this "virtue theory" is a form of ethical rationalism in which reasons derive from the nature of intentional action. Despite its recent popularity, however, ethical rationalism is false. It wrongly assumes that we act "under the guise of the good," or it relies on dubious views about intention and motivation. It follows from the failure of rationalism that the virtue theory is true: we cannot be fully good without the perfection of practical reason, or have that perfection without being good. Addressing such topics as the psychology of virtue and the explanation of action, Reasons without Rationalism is essential reading for philosophers interested in ethics, rationality, or the philosophy of mind. , Paperback, Label: Princeton University Press, Princeton University Press, Produktgruppe: Book, Publiziert: 2010-07-21, Freigegeben: 2010-07-21, Studio: Princeton University Press, Verkaufsrang: 2378731.
Von Händler/Antiquariat, TOTAL BOOKS.
Modern philosophy has been vexed by the question "Why should I be moral?" and by doubts about the rational authority of moral virtue. In Reasons without Rationalism, Kieran Setiya shows that these doubts rest on a mistake. The "should" of practical reason cannot be understood apart from the virtues of character, including such moral virtues as justice and benevolence, and the considerations to which the virtues make one sensitive thereby count as reasons to act. Proposing a new framework for debates about practical reason, Setiya argues that the only alternative to this "virtue theory" is a form of ethical rationalism in which reasons derive from the nature of intentional action. Despite its recent popularity, however, ethical rationalism is false. It wrongly assumes that we act "under the guise of the good," or it relies on dubious views about intention and motivation. It follows from the failure of rationalism that the virtue theory is true: we cannot be fully good without the perfection of practical reason, or have that perfection without being good. Addressing such topics as the psychology of virtue and the explanation of action, Reasons without Rationalism is essential reading for philosophers interested in ethics, rationality, or the philosophy of mind. , Paperback, Label: Princeton University Press, Princeton University Press, Produktgruppe: Book, Publiziert: 2010-07-21, Freigegeben: 2010-07-21, Studio: Princeton University Press, Verkaufsrang: 2378731.
7
Reasons without Rationalism (2010)
EN PB USISBN: 9780691146522 bzw. 0691146527, in Englisch, 144 Seiten, Princeton University Press, Taschenbuch, gebraucht.
Lieferung aus: Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika, Usually ships in 1-2 business days.
Von Händler/Antiquariat, frugalmuse-northgate.
Modern philosophy has been vexed by the question "Why should I be moral?" and by doubts about the rational authority of moral virtue. In Reasons without Rationalism, Kieran Setiya shows that these doubts rest on a mistake. The "should" of practical reason cannot be understood apart from the virtues of character, including such moral virtues as justice and benevolence, and the considerations to which the virtues make one sensitive thereby count as reasons to act. Proposing a new framework for debates about practical reason, Setiya argues that the only alternative to this "virtue theory" is a form of ethical rationalism in which reasons derive from the nature of intentional action. Despite its recent popularity, however, ethical rationalism is false. It wrongly assumes that we act "under the guise of the good," or it relies on dubious views about intention and motivation. It follows from the failure of rationalism that the virtue theory is true: we cannot be fully good without the perfection of practical reason, or have that perfection without being good. Addressing such topics as the psychology of virtue and the explanation of action, Reasons without Rationalism is essential reading for philosophers interested in ethics, rationality, or the philosophy of mind. , Paperback, Label: Princeton University Press, Princeton University Press, Produktgruppe: Book, Publiziert: 2010-07-21, Freigegeben: 2010-07-21, Studio: Princeton University Press, Verkaufsrang: 2378731.
Von Händler/Antiquariat, frugalmuse-northgate.
Modern philosophy has been vexed by the question "Why should I be moral?" and by doubts about the rational authority of moral virtue. In Reasons without Rationalism, Kieran Setiya shows that these doubts rest on a mistake. The "should" of practical reason cannot be understood apart from the virtues of character, including such moral virtues as justice and benevolence, and the considerations to which the virtues make one sensitive thereby count as reasons to act. Proposing a new framework for debates about practical reason, Setiya argues that the only alternative to this "virtue theory" is a form of ethical rationalism in which reasons derive from the nature of intentional action. Despite its recent popularity, however, ethical rationalism is false. It wrongly assumes that we act "under the guise of the good," or it relies on dubious views about intention and motivation. It follows from the failure of rationalism that the virtue theory is true: we cannot be fully good without the perfection of practical reason, or have that perfection without being good. Addressing such topics as the psychology of virtue and the explanation of action, Reasons without Rationalism is essential reading for philosophers interested in ethics, rationality, or the philosophy of mind. , Paperback, Label: Princeton University Press, Princeton University Press, Produktgruppe: Book, Publiziert: 2010-07-21, Freigegeben: 2010-07-21, Studio: Princeton University Press, Verkaufsrang: 2378731.
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Reasons W/o Rationalism
EN NWISBN: 9780691146522 bzw. 0691146527, in Englisch, Princeton University Press, Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika, neu.
Lieferung aus: Schweiz, zzgl. Versandkosten, Neuerscheinung.
Reasons W/o Rationalism, Modern philosophy has been vexed by the question 'Why should I be moral?' and by doubts about the rational authority of moral virtue. Addressing such topics as the psychology of virtue and the explanation of action, this title is suitable for philosophers interested in ethics, rationality, or the philosophy of mind.
Reasons W/o Rationalism, Modern philosophy has been vexed by the question 'Why should I be moral?' and by doubts about the rational authority of moral virtue. Addressing such topics as the psychology of virtue and the explanation of action, this title is suitable for philosophers interested in ethics, rationality, or the philosophy of mind.
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