The Bounds of Freedom: Kant’s Causal Theory of Action (Kantstudien-Ergänzungshefte, Band 191)
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Bounds of Freedom: Kant´s Causal Theory of Action, Greenberg tackles one of Kants most difficult ideas: that we can be the cause of our actions only if the act of our will is free of everything that makes up who we are as individuals. This entails that our free will does not exist in the same time that includes our individuality. The key is an analysis of Kants concept of an action, which includes the will as the cause of the action; so included, the causal connection is àtemporal. Robert Greenberg, Brandeis University, Waltham, Mass. USA. PDF, 26.09.2016.

Bounds of Freedom: Kant´s Causal Theory of Action Greenberg tackles one of Kants most difficult ideas: that we can be the cause of our actions only if the act of our will is free of everything that makes up who we are as individuals. This entails that our free will does not exist in the same time that includes our individuality. The key is an analysis of Kants concept of an action, which includes the will as the cause of the action; so included, the causal connection is àtemporal. Robert Greenberg, Brandeis University, Waltham, Mass. USA. 26.09.2016, PDF.

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Greenberg tackles one of Kant’s most difficult ideas: that we can be the cause of our actions only if the act of our will is free of everything that makes up who we are as individuals. This entails that our free will does not exist in the same time that includes our individuality. The key is an analysis of Kant’s concept of an action, which includes the will as the cause of the action; so included, the causal connection is àtemporal. Robert Greenberg , Brandeis University, Waltham, Mass. USA. Greenberg tackles one of Kant’s most difficult ideas: that we can be the cause of our actions only if the act of our will is free of everything that makes up who we are as individuals. This entails that our free will does not exist in the same time that includes our individuality. The key is an analysis of Kant’s concept of an action, which includes the will as the cause of the action; so included, the causal connection is àtemporal. Robert Greenberg , Brandeis University, Waltham, Mass. USA. Lieferzeit 1-2 Werktage.

Lieferung aus: Deutschland, Versandkostenfrei innerhalb von Deutschland.
Greenberg tackles one of Kant’s most difficult ideas: that we can be the cause of our actions only if the act of our will is free of everything that makes up who we are as individuals. This entails that our free will does not exist in the same time that includes our individuality. The key is an analysis of Kant’s concept of an action, which includes the will as the cause of the action; so included, the causal connection is àtemporal. Robert Greenberg , Brandeis University, Waltham, Mass. USA. Greenberg tackles one of Kant’s most difficult ideas: that we can be the cause of our actions only if the act of our will is free of everything that makes up who we are as individuals. This entails that our free will does not exist in the same time that includes our individuality. The key is an analysis of Kant’s concept of an action, which includes the will as the cause of the action; so included, the causal connection is àtemporal. Robert Greenberg , Brandeis University, Waltham, Mass. USA. Lieferzeit 1-2 Werktage.

Lieferung aus: Deutschland, Erscheint demnächst.
Bounds of Freedom: Kant's Causal Theory of Action, Greenberg tackles one of Kants most difficult ideas: that we can be the cause of our actions only if the act of our will is free of everything that makes up who we are as individuals. This entails that our free will does not exist in the same time that includes our individuality. The key is an analysis of Kants concept of an action, which includes the will as the cause of the action; so included, the causal connection is àtemporal. Robert Greenberg, Brandeis University, Waltham, Mass. USA.

Lieferung aus: Deutschland, Erscheint demnächst.
Bounds of Freedom: Kant's Causal Theory of Action, Greenberg tackles one of Kants most difficult ideas: that we can be the cause of our actions only if the act of our will is free of everything that makes up who we are as individuals. This entails that our free will does not exist in the same time that includes our individuality. The key is an analysis of Kants concept of an action, which includes the will as the cause of the action; so included, the causal connection is àtemporal. Robert Greenberg, Brandeis University, Waltham, Mass. USA.

Lieferung aus: Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika, in-stock.
Greenberg tackles one of Kant's most difficult ideas: that we can be the cause of our actions only if the act of our will is free of everything that makes up who we are as individuals. This entails that our free will does not exist in the same time that includes our individuality. The key is an analysis of Kant's concept of an action, which includes the will as the cause of the action; so included, the causal connection is àtemporal.

Lieferung aus: Deutschland, Versandkostenfrei.
The Bounds of Freedom: Kant`s Causal Theory of Action: This monograph is a new interpretation of Kant`s "temporal conception of the causality of the freedom of the will. The interpretation is based on an analysis of Kant`s primary conception of an action, viz., as a causal consequence of the will. The analysis in turn is based on H. P. Grice`s causal theory of perception and on P. F. Strawson`s modification of the theory. The monograph rejects the customary assumption that Kant`s maxim of an action is a causal determination of the action. It assumes instead that the maxim is definitive of the action, and since its main thesis is that an action for Kant is to be primarily understood as an effect of the will, it concludes that the maxim of an action can only be its logical determination. Kant`s "temporal conception of the causality of free will is confronted not only by contemporary philosophical conceptions of causality, but by Kant`s own complementary theory of causality, in the Second Analogy of Experience. According to this latter conception, causality is a natural relation among physical and psychological objects, and is therefore a temporal relation among them. Faced with this conflict, Kant scholars like Allen W. Wood either reject Kant`s "temporal conception of causality or like Henry E. Allison accept it, but only in an anodyne form. Both camps, however, make the aforementioned assumption that Kant`s maxim of an action is a causal determination of the action. The monograph, rejecting the assumption, belongs to neither camp. Englisch, Taschenbuch.

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Taal: Engels;Formaat: ePub met kopieerbeveiliging (DRM) van Adobe;Kopieerrechten: Het kopiëren van (delen van) de pagina's is niet toegestaan ;Geschikt voor: Alle e-readers te koop bij bol.com (of compatible voor PDF of ePub). Telefoons en tablets met Google Android (1.6 of hoger) voorzien van bol.com boekenbol app. PC en Mac;Geschikt voor: 22 jaar en ouder;Verschijningsdatum: september 2016;ISBN10: 3110491842;ISBN13: 9783110491845; Engelstalig | Ebook | 2016.

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Von Händler/Antiquariat, Amazon.de.
Taschenbuch, Ausgabe: 1, Label: De Gruyter, De Gruyter, Produktgruppe: Book, Publiziert: 2018-06-12, Studio: De Gruyter.