Knowledge, Stakes and Error - 7 Angebote vergleichen

Lieferung aus: Deutschland, Versandkostenfrei innerhalb von Deutschland.
We are all competent in the usage of the term ´´knows´´. For instance, we regularly say things like ´´Hannah knows that we are coming´´ or ´´I don´t know if this is going to work out´´. Making sense of this usage though turns out to be exceedingly difficult. One phenomenon stands out in the debate as particularly hard to explain: Our willingness to ascribe knowledge depends not just on familiar features such as how much evidence the putative knower has or whether she truly believes what she We are all competent in the usage of the term ´´knows´´. For instance, we regularly say things like ´´Hannah knows that we are coming´´ or ´´I don´t know if this is going to work out´´. Making sense of this usage though turns out to be exceedingly difficult. One phenomenon stands out in the debate as particularly hard to explain: Our willingness to ascribe knowledge depends not just on familiar features such as how much evidence the putative knower has or whether she truly believes what she putatively knows. Whether we ascribe knowledge also depends on practical and conversational factors such as how much is at stake and which error-possibilities we happen to take seriously. This book provides an extensive overview of the relevant data from both armchair and experimental philosophy. On that basis, it discusses a class of candidate accounts collectively referred to as insensitivism. A novel insensitive account is offered that brings to bear results from cognitive psychology. Sofort lieferbar Lieferzeit 1-2 Werktage.

Lieferung aus: Deutschland, Versandkostenfrei.
Knowledge, Stakes and Error: We are all competent in the usage of the term `knows`. For instance, we regularly say things like `Hannah knows that we are coming` or `I don`t know if this is going to work out`. Making sense of this usage though turns out to be exceedingly difficult. One phenomenon stands out in the debate as particularly hard to explain: Our willingness to ascribe knowledge depends not just on familiar features such as how much evidence the putative knower has or whether she truly believes what she putatively knows. Whether we ascribe knowledge also depends on practical and conversational factors such as how much is at stake and which error-possibilities we happen to take seriously. This book provides an extensive overview of the relevant data from both armchair and experimental philosophy. On that basis, it discusses a class of candidate accounts collectively referred to as insensitivism. A novel insensitive account is offered that brings to bear results from cognitive psychology. Englisch, Taschenbuch.

Lieferung aus: Österreich, zzgl. Versandkosten.
A Psychological Account The term know is one of the ten most common verbs in English, and yet a central aspect of its usage remains mysterious. Our willingness to ascribe knowledge depends not just on epistemic factors such as the quality of our evidence. It also depends on seemingly non-epistemic factors. For instance, we become less inclined to ascribe knowledge when its important to be right, or once our attention is drawn to possible sources of error. Accounts of this phenomenon proliferate, but no consensus has been achieved, decades of research notwithstanding. The author offers a fresh examination of this ongoing debate. After reviewing and complementing relevant data from both armchair and experimental philosophy, he assesses extant accounts of this data including semantic, metaphysical, pragmatic, doxastic as well as more recent psychological accounts. Against this background, he offers a novel psychological account based on the idea that non-epistemic factors affect estimates of probability. 01.06.2019, Taschenbuch.

Lieferung aus: Schweiz, Versandfertig innert 1 - 2 Werktagen.
A Psychological Account, The term know is one of the ten most common verbs in English, and yet a central aspect of its usage remains mysterious. Our willingness to ascribe knowledge depends not just on epistemic factors such as the quality of our evidence. It also depends on seemingly non-epistemic factors. For instance, we become less inclined to ascribe knowledge when its important to be right, or once our attention is drawn to possible sources of error. Accounts of this phenomenon proliferate, but no consensus has been achieved, decades of research notwithstanding. The author offers a fresh examination of this ongoing debate. After reviewing and complementing relevant data from both armchair and experimental philosophy, he assesses extant accounts of this data including semantic, metaphysical, pragmatic, doxastic as well as more recent psychological accounts. Against this background, he offers a novel psychological account based on the idea that non-epistemic factors affect estimates of probability. Taschenbuch, 01.06.2019.

Lieferung aus: Deutschland, Next Day, Versandkostenfrei.
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